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Abstract 
Out of the many historical political events of the last 
few years, in terms of outer space and outer space 
law the final demise of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991 no doubt was the most important. 
One of the two superpowers in space disappeared as 
a state never to return. The fifteen republics 
formerly comprising the Soviet Union entered the 
international community of states more or less in its 
stead, eleven of them willing - so far - to remain 
together within a framework for cooperation 
ominously named "Commonwealth of Independent 
States". 
As to outer space, nine of those eleven states within 
a week of the final demise of the Soviet Union 
concluded the Minsk Space Agreement. The 
Agreement was in force instantly, which is rather 
unique and points to the importance attached by the 
states involved to continuation in principle of 
conducting space activities together. It is in the 
framework of this Agreement that the future of the 
space program of the former Soviet Union is to be 
analyzed in legal terms, both as to programs already 
in operation, as to programs which are really only in 
a phase of development. In this respect comparisons 
with the European Space Agency have indeed 
already been made. 
Furthermore, as one of the key-elements in the 
historical events concerning the Soviet Union 
consists of the transfer to a sort of capitalist society, a 
glance at the role private enterprise is supposed to 
play and is allowed to play under the Minsk Space 
Agreement is in point. Once again, the European 
Space Agency may provide an interesting example. 
Thus, some light might be shed on the question as to 
whether the former Soviet Union will witness the 
development or creation of a European Space 
Agency, Mark II, or a fundamentally different legal 
framework for space activities. 
Copyright ©1992 by author. Published by the American 
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1. Introduction 
The death blow was dealt to the Soviet Union in 
December 1991. On the 1st of that month, in a 
referendum in the Ukraine, after Russia the most 
important of the Soviet Republics, an overwhelming 
majority of 90,32 % voted for Ukrainian 
independence. Russia and its President Boris Yeltsin 
amongst others drew the obvious conclusion that a 
Soviet Union without the Ukraine was not a viable 
option; and on the 8th of December, in Minsk an 
agreement on a Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) to replace the former Soviet Union was 
concluded by Russia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia.1 
Although President of the USSR Mikhael Gorbachev 
tried to keep whatever was effectively left of the 
Soviet Union alive, the other former republics 
quickly choose sides with the CIS, and eight of them 
(Georgia in the end not being included) on the 21st 
of December in Alma Ata officially joinded the C1S.2 
On Christmas 1991 Gorbachev accepted these 
realities and stepped down; exit the Soviet Union, 
enters the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
2. The Soviet Union is dead, long lives the 
Commonwealth of Independent States: the 
Transition 
One of the two superpowers in space, in fact the first 
to enter outer space and the first to introduce men 
into outer space, had thereby disappeared. The 
problem is that, despite the suggestion that the role 
of successor would be assigned to the CIS, it actually 
were the fifteen republiCS formerly comprising the 
Soviet Union which entered the international 
community of states more or less in its stead. The 
CIS namely is not a state under international law to 
any extent, and therefore not in the position for 
instance to simply succeed to the former Soviet 
Union's international legal obligations} The CIS is 
based on an agreement, the so-called Minsk 
Agreement of 8 December 1991, as amended by a 
protocol to that Agreement, the so-called Alma Ata 
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Protocol of 21 December 1991, with High 
Contracting Parties, and not on a Constitution. 
For space endeavours and space law that has 
important consequences. The space industry of the 
former Soviet Union was spread over almost the 
whole of the territory of that Soviet Union, in other 
words over most of the presently independent 
republics4. Russia is still by far the most important of 
those, accounting for the largest part of the industry 
(heavily concentrated around Moscow moreover) of 
launchers, satellites, equipment and other items to 
be used in outer space activities, most ground 
tracking stations, spacecraft control centres and 
design bureaus. The Ukraine however has an 
important space industry too, plus two ground 
tracking stations at Ternopol and Evpatoria. 
Kazakhstan is even more important: although 
Russia has two launching facilities at Plesetsk and 
Kapustin Yar, the by far biggest and best placed 
cosmodrome is that of Bajkonur in Kazakhstan. 
Other republics are of lesser importance in terms of 
space activities, although their existence in principle 
for the purpose of space activities must indeed be 
acknowledged. 
The falling apart of the Soviet Union and the 
important consequences arising therefrom for the 
space industry involved happened to coincide more 
or less with another string of developments. Since 
glasnost and perestrojka have been gaining ground 
commercialization to a slowly but increasing extent 
was introduced in the field of space activities.S No 
doubt, the tendency thus apparent in Soviet space 
industry to commercialize, which inevitably will lead 
to a significant amount of privatization too, will only 
grow stronger in the coming years, due to the 
increasing introduction of capitalist ideas and 
elements in the economy of the former Soviet 
Union 6 , the downgrading of defense as a 
consequence of the end of the Cold War7 and the 
otherwise prevailing financial and economic 
difficulties making it unlikely for much public 
money to be spent in outer space - relative to the 
extents to which such money used to be spent in the 
old Soviet Union8. 
3. Former Soviets in Space: the Minsk Agreement 
Nevertheless, space remains a big issue in the 
republics of the former superpower in space. Nine of 
those eleven states participating in the CIS within a 
week of the final demise of the Soviet Union 
concluded the Minsk Space Agreement9., whereas 
the Ukraine has joined later, in July 199210. The 
Agreement was in force instantly11, which is rather 
unique and points to the importance attached by the 
states concerned to continuation in principle of 
conducting space activities together. It is in the 
framework of this Agreement that the future of the 
space program of the former Soviet Union is to be 
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analyzed in legal terms, wherefore an analysis of the 
Minsk Space Agreement is now in point.1 2 This 
analysis is to take place along the lines provided for 
by a few basic elements of that Agreement; notably 
the organizational structure possibly arising from it, 
the programs to be covered by it, the financial 
framework (both on the expenditure- and on the 
income-sides), the special question of the 
infrastructure and the use thereof, some specially 
important issues of space law as far as reflected 
(and, as far as not reflected, the consequences 
thereof), and the question of accessions to the 
Agreement. 
The Minsk Space Agreement to begin with does not, 
to any extent, create an international organization, 
with independent legal personality at least in 
muniCipal legal systems and powers distinct from 
those of the totality of the 'member states'. Yet, an 
embryonic structure is present in the Agreement, 
just as it is the case in the Minsk Agreement on the 
Commonwealth at large. In view moreover of the 
actual interdependence of the former Soviet Union's 
space endeavours and the resulting 
interdependence in space activities of the states 
concerned, a kind of community-of-necessity is 
existing more or less covered by the framework 
developed in the Minsk Space Agreement; a 
community of ten states which I will call, for lack of 
better words, the 'Space Commonwealth'. 
The basis of future space research and exploitation 
within this 'Space Commonwealth' is to be formed by 
interstate programs 13, to be coordinated by the 
Interstate Space Council14. This does not mean that 
states can be active in outer space only in the 
framework of the Space Agreement: their right to 
have independent space programs is explicitly 
confirmed 15, although the states pledged to bring at 
least all activities concerning rocket technology 
within the ambit of the interstate programs16. Then, 
all military and dual purpose (meaning both military 
and civilian) space research and exploitation 
programs are to be "ensured/assured by the joint 
strategic armed forces"17, which is a rather 
ambiguous formula. 
Finally, as to the activities which are enVisaged 
indeed under the Space Agreement, a difference is 
made here as to "interstate programs for space 
research and exploitation" in Article 4, and "the 
exploitation of existing and the setting up of new 
space systems for economic, scientific and military 
purposes and the maintenance of the unique testing 
base" of Article 518, apparently focussing on the 
large launchers, launching facilities, satellite 
systems and the space station "Mir". 
The distinction thus introduced becomes especially 
important when we turn to the financial issues of 
in terstate cooperation. The costs of 'Article 4-
programs' are to be "financed by means of 
proportionate contributions by the states 
participating in the present agreement"19. This 
leaves a number of questions open, however, as to 
what proportions would be chosen etcetera. Such 
legal uncertainty has been avoided on the issue of 
'Article 5-programs', for on a specific program 
"expenditure ( ... ) [is to bel distributed in accordance 
with the proportionate participation,,20 in such a 
program. This would almost be a superfluous 
tautology, if it did not also cover potential profit 
gained from such exploitation activities. 
If independent programs of states, the only 
alternative to interstate programs as defined under 
the Agreement, are planned to make use of the 
infrastructure of other states, the interested parties 
have to determine such use by separate 
agreements21 , no doubt providing for a different 
financial settlement than enVisaged under the 
Minsk Space Agreement itself. The latter provides 
concerning interstate programs that they are to be 
"implemented on the basis of existing space 
complexes and space infrastructure facilities", just 
as those programs which are "being set up,,22 . The 
states concerned in this respect oblige themselves 
"not to make decisions or carry out actions which 
entail the cessation (impediment) of the normal 
functioning of space centers and facilities in the 
space infrastructure sited on their territories,,23. 
Space law, and especially its important 
responsibility- and liability-regimes, is also dealt with 
in the Minsk Space Agreement, be it in summary 
fashion. The states of the 'Space Commonwealth' are 
to develop their activities "in accordance with 
existing international (legal) norms,,24, but the 
contents of their state responsibility, other than that 
it is acknowledged in general, need elaboration in a 
special agreement25, whereas the procedure for 
assigning "compensation for damages associated 
with the use of space equipment,,26 also depends 
upon further decisions. Reference in this respect 
may be had to the Preamble, although this does of 
course not provide for a binding legal obligation.27 
Nevertheless, the general principles of state 
responsibility for national activities not in conformity 
with international space law28 and liability of a state 
for damage caused by objects launched by it, with its 
help, or from its territory or facility29, will of course 
continue to apply to these ten states of the 'Space 
Commonwealth,3D, irrespective of the precise 
content of the Minsk Space Agreement31 . It will also 
be clear that, the CIS itself, being no state and no 
state successor to the Soviet Union, can never be 
held responsible or liable under space law for 
material breaches of obligations or damage 
occurring, nor will it be able to act as a registration 
state and exercise some kind of 'quasi-jurisdiction' 
as long as it does not at least become an 
international organization. 
In this respect it is to be noted that both Russia and 
Kazakhstan, the two only republics with launching 
facilities and therefore very liable to become liable 
as launching states32, are among the ten parties to 
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the Minsk Space Agreement. Their international 
obligations under Articles VI and VII of the Outer 
Space Treaty, of special importance in this light, are 
thus reinforced at least in a principled way by the 
commitments under the Minsk Space Agreement, 
especially of course Articles 6 and 7 as dealt with 
above. 
As to Moldova, although no party to the Minsk 
Space Agreement itself,. it is nevertheless still bound 
to the international obligations arising for instance 
from Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space Treaty, 
as firstly, those Articles are codifications of 
customary law valid outside of the treaty framework, 
and secondly, Articles 12 and 13 of the Minsk 
Agreement establishing the CIS confirm a general 
duty to abide by legal international obligations 
applicable to the former Soviet Union. 
For those four former Soviet republics remaining 
outside of the Commonwealth-framework and its 
subframework for space activities, Georgia, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, at least the first 
remark on customary validity of the Outer Space 
Treaty's principles would apply, even apart from 
questions concerning state succession to obligations 
of the former Soviet Union. 
Finally, it is to be noted that Article 1 of the Minsk 
Space Agreement allows for accession by other 
states, be it in such a general way33 that it is not 
clear whether accession can only be in respect of 
"the present agreement" as a whole, or whether "the 
consent of the participating state" would also allow 
for adherence to specific programs only. This 
question will for the time being be perhaps of an 
academic character, and moreover probably be 
solved in the end rather by practice than by legal 
refinement, yet the point is to be noted. 
This then is the general legal framework for space 
activities of the former Soviet Union, as it evolved 
from the dramatic developments of last December, 
1991. Before turning to consecutive developments 
and their relationship with, and relevance for this 
legal framework, it will be very interesting to reflect 
on the latter by way of comparing it to that other 
existing general legal framework for cooperation in 
outer space activities between independent 
sovereign states in Europe, that of the European 
Space Agency. 
4. Western Europeans in Space: the European Space 
A~ency 
The European Space Agency (ESA) evolved out of 
two prior international European organizations in 
the field of space activities, the European Space 
Research Organization (ESRO) and the European 
Organization for the Development and Construction 
of Space Vehicle Launchers (ESRO), which had been 
established in 1962-4. ESA, more or less merging 
these two organizations, was established in 1975 by 
way of the Convention for the Establishment of a 
European Space Agency (hereafter ESA 
Convention), which entered into force in 1980.34 At 
present, ESA consists of thirteen member states 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Spain and the United Kingdom), one 
further associate member state (Finland, since 1987) 
and one non-European state participating ad hoc in 
specific projects (Canada).35 Thus, it may be said 
~hat more or less all western European states 
mterested in space activities are members of ESA 
and parties to the ESA Convention. 
This brings us to the fact that analysis of the ESA 
Convention, for the purpose of comparison to the 
Minsk Space Agreement, should start with the 
important remark that, unlike that Agreement of 
course, the ESA Convention provides for a veritable 
international organization to be established 
thereby.36 ESA consists essentially of two organs. 
First there is the Council, composed of 
representatives of the member states37, and in that 
regard similar to the Interstate Space Council, 
although the ESA Council, both in legal theory38 and 
in developed practice, provides for a much more 
elaborated and detailed example. Second there is 
the Director General assisted by a staff39 , 
comprising the true organizational aspect of ESA as 
illustrated furthermore for instance by the 
provisions of Article XV on legal personality and 
diplomat-like privileges and immunities in 
accordance with Annex I, aspects which are 
conspicuously missing in the Minsk Space 
Agreement. Coordination of cooperation in the 
framework of ESA 40 is therefore infinitely more 
structured and smooth than it will be the case under 
the Minsk Space Agreement - at least as soon as old 
Soviet habits have withered away under the force of 
decen.tralizing tendencies, and new relationships in 
prachce concerning space activities have been 
established among the states concerned. 
This conclusion becomes even more apt if one looks 
at the activities that are to take place under the 
respective frameworks. ESA, just like the 'Space 
CommonWealth', allows of course for space 
programs to be executed outside of its framework. 41 
Furthermore, where the Minsk Space Agreement to 
say the least is somewhat ambiguous when it comes 
to military and dual purpose activities, the ESA 
Convention is unequivocal in its exclusion of military 
activities, whatever the precise meaning of that 
phrase.42 This evaluation is especially important in 
the light of the other side of the coin: whereas with 
ESA it is effectively excluded that any military organ 
or organization is undertaking space activities in its 
framework (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) 
taking over these functions), that is not so clear in 
respect of the the 'Space Commonwealth'.43 
When it comes to the programs to be executed 
within its framework, the ESA Convention also 
provides for a somewhat clearer and much more 
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elaborated distinction than the Minsk Space 
Agreement does, almost implicitly, in its Articles 4 
and 5. Article V of the ESA Convention is crucial 
here, as it makes the basic distinction between 
"mandatory activities" and "optional activities", while 
adding a specific sub-category of the latter, of 
"operational activities". Final comparison on the 
Article 4-Article 5-Minsk Space Agreement 
respectively Article VO.a)-Article V(1.b)-ESA 
Convention congruency must wait until 
developments or amendments have clarified these 
points; whereas the remaining incongruity perhaps 
is solved by the introduction in the ESA Convention 
of "operational activities" with respect to "space 
applications,,44. 
In this respect it must also be noted that Europe has 
witnessed the coming into existence of two 
commercial companies nurtured by ESA making 
use of the developed hardware for launching 
respectively remote sensing activities 
(Arianespace45 respectively SPOTlmage46) and two 
international organizations of a mixed character 
using ESA-developed space hardware for 
operational activities (EUTELSAT47 and 
EUMETSAT48); in all these cases different measures 
of participation and involvement, with varying 
degrees of privatization, were allowed for and indeed 
envisaged. 
The structure created for financing space activities 
under the ESA Convention is closely related to the 
distinction between the various sorts of activities49 -
just as it is the case with the Minsk Space 
Agreement. Mandatory activities, to be participated 
in by all member states, are to be financed in 
accordance with an elaborate system of division of 
contributions, with the average national income of 
the member states as the decisive criterion.50 This 
sounds similar to a large extent to the phrase of 
Article 4 of the Minsk Space Agreement, on 
"proportionate contributions by the states 
participating in the present agreement" in regard of 
"interstate programs for space research and 
explOitation", and would thus be a reason for 
comparing the respective sets of activities to be 
undertaken thereunder. 
Likewise, or rather mirrorwise, for the 'moment the 
suggested similarity between "the proportionate 
participation" (which may be zero, in theory) as to 
expenditure concerning specific activities under 
Article 5 of the Minsk Space Agreement, and the 
possibility to opt out of the activities covered by 
Article V(1.b) of the ESA Convention and the 
concurrent proportionate financing51 of systems 
remains noticeable. 
The same remark holds more or less true for the 
speCial category of "operational activities", where it is 
bluntly stated that "[tlhe cost of such operational 
activities shall be borne by the users concerned", 
and this, "under conditions to be defined by the 
Council by a majority of all Member States .. 52 . 
Needless to say, these conditions have been shown 
to entail proportionality of expenditure to 
involvement. Once more, reference may be had 
here also to such special examples as Arianespace 
and SPOTlmage, where 'expenditure' relates to the 
investments by states, directly or indirectly, in these 
companies, and EUTELSAT and EUMETSAT, where 
in yet another way states are spending in proportion 
to the use they are making of specific systems and 
services.53 
For ESA, the issue of profits potentially resulting 
from certain space activities is not directly dealt with 
in the Convention. The succinct phrase that 
"operational activities", the only ones liable to realize 
profits under normal circumstances, are to be 
allowed under specific conditions to be provided for 
by the Council - as quoted before - nevertheless 
leaves ample room for the most logical division of 
any profits eventually accruing directly or indirectly 
from a specific activity, namely in proportion to the 
expenditure on that same activity, as is the case in 
the 'Space Commonwealth'. In case of profits arising 
under (other) mandatory and optional activities, it 
still seems that for example Annex III would also 
allow for the logical solution of proportionate 
division of eventual profits. 
Furthermore, although neither specificly nor exactly 
related to the rather general provision concerning 
operational activities, it is interesting to note Annex 
V, as an extension of Article VII of the ESA 
Convention on industrial policy. This Annex provides 
for the principle of "just return" as it has been 
dubbed, of an "overall return coefficient,,54, 
meaning that a minimum percentage (Annex V 
provides for an absolute minimum of 80%, while at 
present it lies at 96%55) of sums invested by a certain 
state in a certain program will have to accrue, in the 
form of value of contracts, to companies of those 
respective states. If one envisages international 
contracts - coupled with the potential to realize 
profits of course - granted to one's own private 
companies as an indirect kind of profit accruing to 
oneself, one could speak of an indirect kind of 
proportionate sharing of profits. 
At the same time, in the light of this elaborate 
system it becomes already clear to what little extent 
the Minsk Space Agreement did already reckon with 
the possibility of private entities becoming involved 
in activities directly under that Agreement. No 
doubt, the absence of any significant organizational 
structure in the 'Space Commonwealth' will mainly 
account for this fact, yet, the difference in this 
respect with ESA is telling. 
The infrastructure and facilities of ESA may, just as 
infrastructure and facilities falling under the Minsk 
Space Agreement, also be used for programs not 
regulated by the relevant convention, i.e. especially 
national programs. This allowance however is with 
the caveat that ESA's use for its own activities and 
programs should not be prejudiced thereby, 
providing for a clear priority of international 
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programs in this respect mlssmg from the Minsk 
Space Agreement. In general, these clauses are 
formulated in a stricter and more straightforward 
sense, but this is perhaps only logical as the 
independent existence of an organization such as 
ESA provides for a clear and direct 'target' for the 
use of 'common' facilities. Otherwise, the issue of 
infrastructure and the use thereof is of much less 
importance in the case of ESA than it is in the case of 
the 'Space Commonwealth'. 
The other side to the use of infrastructure finally is 
dealt with under Article VIII(1) of the ESA 
Convention, where emphasis is laid on the priority of 
the use of ESA's infrastructure for its programs and 
those of the member states, rather than an absolute 
obligation to do so as suggested in the Minsk Space 
Agreement56, 
Issues of general international space law are not 
reflected in the ESA Convention itself. However, the 
European Space Agency has made Declarations 
whereby it accepted the rights and obligations of the 
three principal treaties emanating from some of the 
principles of the Outer Space Treaty, notably the 
Rescue Agreement57, the Liability Convention58, 
and the Registration Convention59. Finally, with the 
repeated assertion that ESA will be active only for 
"exclusively peaceful purposes .. 60, compliance with 
another cluster of principles (this time material 
ones) is guaranteed.61 In conclusion, ESA through 
the years has, been able to take into account to a 
considerably greater extent and much more 
explicitly as of yet than the 'Space Commonwealth' 
the existing rights and obligations of space law. 
Like the 'Space Commonwealth', ESA allows for 
accession, but unlike it, the ESA Convention allows 
for other interesting opportunities in this area than 
the rather summary formula of the Minsk Space 
Agreement that "[olther states can join the present 
agreement,,62. ESA's counterpart to that formula is 
found in Article XXII, which allows for accession 
"following a decision of the Council taken by a 
unanimous vote of all Member States". Apart from 
ordinary, full membership the possibility of 
"associate membership" is allowed for states whose 
only fixed obligation incurred thereby is "to 
contribute at least to the studies of future projects 
under Article V(1.aj)", i.e. one kind of mandatory 
activities, whereas other rights and obligations are to 
be "defined by the Council by a two-thirds majority 
of all Member States,,63. As already mentioned, 
since] 987 Finland has made use of this pOSSibility to 
become involved with ESA projects in a 
fundamental, yet not comprehensive way. 
For another kind of mandatory and for all optional 
activities another possibility of cooperation is 
enVisaged: that of "participation by non-member 
States or international organisations in one or more 
of the programmes"64 concerned. Again, detailed 
arrangements are to be defined by the Council in 
this respect. Canada is the prime example of a non-
ESA member state having taken the chance for 
cooperation in a lot of programs without 
fundamental involvement in ESA's day-to-day 
business. 
Finally, Article XIV leaves ESA and its member 
states even more leeway in defining forms of 
cooperation by the general formula that "[tlhe 
Agency may, upon decisions of the Council taken by 
unanimous votes of all Member States, cooperate 
with other international organisations and 
institutions and with Governments, organisations 
and institutions of non-member States, and 
conclude agreements with them to this effect,,65. 
Thus, for instance ESA in 1988 has entered into the 
large international project of realizing and operating 
the space station "Freedom" together with the 
United States, Japan and Canada, and recently has 
realized several agreements with Russia on 
.. 'f' . t 66 cooperatlOn m speCl IC space proJec s . 
In short: a large range of forms of participation and 
cooperation with non-ESA member states. i~ po~sib~e 
under the ESA Convention, down to partICIpatIOn m 
a specific program only. Of course, complementary 
to this large range of forms of participation is a large 
range of financial involvement. The history of the 
past years has shown how well this flexible 
appproach has worked. 
5. A "Commonwealth In Space": Developments of 
1992 
With that we arrive back in 1992, and at the same 
time we are back in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, and the 'Space Commonwealth' 
of states parties to the Minsk Space Agreement. The 
most important developments in terms of space 
activities since the conclusion of that Agreement on 
30 December 1991 roughly fall into three categories: 
internal-institutional, actual-internal and 
international-cooperational. 
As to the institutional developments taking place on 
the territory of the former Soviet Union, the most 
fundamental was the establishement of five space 
agencies67 . Three of those were Russian, and on 
closer look only one of those would qualify as a 'real' 
(national) space agency: the Russian Space Agency 
RSA, the Statute of which was approved by a Decree 
of 9 April by the Government of the Russian 
Federation.68 It confirms the preponderance of the 
military, while leaving rather unclear what role 
private organizations can play here. Two other 
organizations, NPO Energia and Glavkosmos, are 
supposed to take care of the commercial aspects ~f 
Russian space endeavours somehow under the aegIs 
of the RSA; but it remains to be seen to what extent 
they can be called private companies. 
Thus, the situation within Russia seems not so much 
to resemble the American one69, where NASA 
actively conducts numerous space activities itself, as 
it does the French one, with the CNES as a spider in 
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the web regulating and stimulating activities while 
itself the governmental and responsible body, and 
"Les Soch~tes Commerciales Filiales,,70 such as 
Arianespace and SPOTImage, actually undertaki~g 
activities in outer space - be it with international, In 
casu ESA and ESA-member involvement. 
Outside Russia, the Kazakhstan Space Agency 
(KSA) has been formed 71, also dubbed Kazakhstan 
Kosmos72, already in September 1991. Little can be 
said as to its role and functions, however, as the main 
Kazakh asset Bajkonur still seems not to be 
operated by it. Furthermore, in May 1992 the 
National Space Agency of the Ukraine (NSAU) has 
been established 73. The NSAU's budget and 
direction will be discussed in the Ukrainian 
parliament in October 1992; as to the latter issue, a 
similar relations~hip between NSAU and NPO 
Yuzhnoye (the factory of Zenit ballistic missiles in 
Dnepropetrovsk) may be envisaged as between the 
RSA and NPO Energia/Glavkosmos, but of course 
final analysis will have to wait here, too. 
In general it may be concluded that the setting up of 
these agencies and the elaboration thereof in the~ry, 
although important, is really no more than a fust 
step on the road to creation of a true 
'Commonwealth In Space' along the lines of the 
Minsk Space Agreement. Moreover, the example 
developed furthest, that of the RSA74, seems to 
point in quite a different direction that such a 'Space 
Commonwealth' is to take than ESA has shown so 
far: military authorities and activities having been 
shown to remain inseparable from civilian ones in 
the CIS-framework; opportunities for commercial -
and certainly private commercial - activities 
remaining vague and insecure. 
Actual developments in this field likewise seem to 
provide us with ambiguous conclusions. Thus, the 
Ukraine, by later acceding to the 'Space 
Commonwealth', has evidently recognized the 
im possibili ty to be active in space without. its 
traditional partners in Russia and the launchmg 
base in Kazakhstan. On the other hand, historical 
and psychological reasons as evidenced for instance 
by the Black See Fleet controversy75, as wel1 as 
economic and financial reasons may very wel1 force 
the Ukraine to look elsewhere in terms of 
cooperation?6 . . 
The most important issue of controversy wIthm the 
'Space Commonwealth' moreover seems to h~ve 
been dealt with in a rather haphazard and reactIve 
fashion: the preponderance of Russia at the 
Bajkonur site in Kazakhstan and the appar~nt 
absence so far of any substantial Kazakh authonty 
over the base. What meanwhile should be noted, is 
that one way or another for the time being it will 
remain the military, i.e. the joint strategic armed 
forces, alternatively the Unified Armed Forces, 
which will be in control of Bajkonur?7 
In this respect, in May 1992 an agreement had been 
signed in Tashkent by all CIS member states except 
Moldova, on the rights over ground infrastructure, in 
conformity with the provisions of Articles 5 and 10 of 
the Minsk Space Agreement. From what is known so 
far, the strategic forces of the CIS indeed basically 
remain in control of all ground segment elements, 
although the property thereof legally has been 
'transferred' to the respective republics on whose 
territories they are situated 78. 
The most undisputed conclusion which can 
therefore be drawn from actual developments within 
the CIS in 1992 so far, is that the traditional 
interlinkage of various parts of the former Soviet 
Union, leading to the present dependence of the 
CIS-republics on each other, is a very important, if 
not indeed crucial aspect in whatever 
'Commonwealth In Space' is going to develop. As of 
yet rather little evidence is found in the 
developments discussed of a framework arising 
according to the spirit and principles of the Minsk 
Space Agreement or its individual articles. 
On the other hand, space law did not need to be 
invoked as of yet by third states in order to remind 
CIS-states that their international obligations under 
Articles 5, 6 and 7 were not kept. The promise 
apparently made to Kazakhstan79 on refunding any 
damage ariSing to that republic as a consequence of 
launching activities from Bajkonur is a first 
confirmation of these fundamental principles. That, 
however, has of course not really much to do with an 
ESA-like structure. 
Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to relations with 
non-'Space Commonwealth' and non-CIS member 
states. Experience so far has shown, that whatever 
international cooperation efforts were devised, the 
partner for third states was not the CIS or the 'Space 
Commonwealth', but rather the Russian Federation 
and its Russian Space Agency, and, exceptionally, 
other individual member states of the CIS. With 
ESA that is different; many cooperational efforts 
were directed at ESA rather than at its individual 
member states. 
Russia for all practical purposes indeed seems to 
have taken the place of the former Soviet Union, and 
not the Commonwealth of Independent States. This 
conclusion may perhaps seem a little rash and not 
very juridical, but the neglect shown by both US and 
ESA space officials· in regard of for instance the 
Ukraine's ha~dware, efforts and plans80, in spite of 
the potential of that state in terms of its Zenit 
rockets, scientific satellites and instruments, seems 
a little too strange to be overlooked .. 
6. Conclusion 
The main conclusion that can be drawn so far from 
the above analysis, is that it seems to be too early for 
all practical purposes to compare the 'Space 
Commonwealth' with the European Space Agency 
on an equal footing. The basic legal framework of the 
former as provided by the Minsk Space Agreement, 
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through factual ties perhaps still including to some 
extent the five non-adherents as well, is far too little 
elaborated in this respect. At the same time, the 
effort of comparing does indeed highlight some of 
the most important aspects of the 'Space 
Commonwealth', and it must be said, of the most 
important Shortcomings thereof - and thus may 
provide a tool for amelioration. 
The organizational structure of the 'Space 
Commonwealth' is fundamentally different from 
that of ESA, and a new Agreement (or related 
amendment) would be necessary to create a true 
international organization on the basis of the Minsk 
Space Agreement instead of a 'mere' 
Commonwealth. The potentially disruptive effects of 
the absence so far of any institutional structure is 
shown by the direction actual developments have 
taken since December 1991: the 'Space 
Commonwealth' has no· 'body', with all due 
consequences thereof. It can only be said that it may 
present a beginning, and as such of course is better 
than nothing at all. 
On the issue of programs, and the related one of 
financial arrangements some kind of similarity may 
be detected between ESA and the 'Space 
Commonwealth'. For the moment however the 
differences, especially for instance concerning the 
respective roles of military authorities, and, largely 
the other way round, the role envisaged for private 
enterprise, seem the more telling. Actual 
developments seem to relate more to a historically 
developed background than to the structure, 
however vague, envisaged by the Minsk Space 
Agreement. This at the same time means of course 
that it is not totally out of the question for future 
developments to take yet another direction - for 
instance, of closer similarity to ESA. 
The relevance of the historical background, of 
military preponderance and virtual absence of 
private activities, is shown even more clearly when 
the issue of infrastructure is considered, where the 
respective rules have no relation to each other 
whatsoever because of the diametrically opposite 
positions of departure, in terms of regulatory 
relevance. As a consequence, the rather well-
organized and -coordinated use over the years by 
ESA of old and new infrastructure contrasts 
significantly with the central problem-generating 
role which especially existing infrastructure seems to 
have in the context of the 'Space Commonwealth'. 
Finally, perhaps the flexibility of both ESA-
arrangements and the Minsk Space Agreement in 
terms of possible variations in intensity and form of 
international cooperation, although not identical 
when closely scrutinized in a legal way, by being 
similar in potentiality, may in the end also provide 
the best instrument for safely and peacefully 
resolving existing and future conflicts within the 
'Space Commonwealth' and the CIS at large, and 
steer that 'Space Commonwealth' more in the 
direction of a 'Commonwealth In Space'. For 
international cooperation, after all a fundamental 
principle of the Outer Space Treaty and outer space 
law, especially if it on the one hand is to include not 
only Russia and on the other hand is yet to include 
ESA, can be a particular apt means in the context of 
the 'Space Commonwealth' for experiencing the 
advantages of developing some kind of European 
Space Agency, Mark II. 
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